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TORT LIABILITY OF LABOR UNIONS
FOR PICKET LINE ASSAULTS

In the tense and volatile atmosphere that accompanies labor
disputes, no situation is more likely to produce violence than the
picket line. The confrontation of antagonistic parties at the picket
line enhances the possibility of personal assaults. Although assaults by pickets will usually be unfair labor practices,1 the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 does not provide a
mechanism for fully compensating the victims of such assaults. 3 In
addition, those who commit picket line assaults will often be
judgment-proof. 4 Thus, in order to secure adequate compensation
for their injuries, the victims of picket line assaults must be able to
attach tort liability to labor unions. 5
This article will discuss whether tort actions against unions for
picket line assaults are preempted by the National Labor Relations
Act, and if not preempted, what forums are available to hear such
actions. This article will also examine the theories that have been
used to hold unions liable for the assaults committed by their
picketers. Included in this discussion will be an analysis of the
policy considerations offered in support of the various theories of
liability.
I.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND CHOICE OF FORUM

Three potential forums are available for the adjudication of labor
relations disputes: the state courts, the federal courts, and the
1
.·
Section 8 (b)(l)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or·coerce an employee attempting to exercise
his section 7 rights to organize, bargain collectively through agents of his own choosing, or
to.refrain from such concerted activity. 29 U. S.C. § 158(b)( l)(A) (1970). The National Labor
Relations Board has found picket line assaults to be a violation of section 8 (b)(l)(A).
Teamsters Local 783 [Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville], 160 N.L.R.B, 1776 (1966);
Local 888, UAW [Miami Plating Co.], 144 N.L.R.B. 897 (1%3).
2
29 u.s.c. §§ 151-168 (1970).
3
The National Labor Relations Act only grants the National Labor Relations Board the
power to make an award of back pay, not damages for pain and suffering. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1970). See also UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
4
J3 MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 282 (1975).
• The tort liability of labor unions for picket line assaults is discussed in Evans, The Law
of Agency and the National Unions, 49 KY. L.J. 295 (1961); Myers, State Damage Suit by
an Employer Against a. Labor Union for Injuries Incurred Through Violence During a
Strike, 34 TENN. L. REv. 609 (1967); Comment, The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket
Line Assaults, 21 U .C.L.A.L. REv. 600 (1973).
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 6 the Supreme Court held that where
the "activity is arguably subject" to section 7 or 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act, the state and federal courts "must defer to
the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board. " 7 The Court reasoned that unless the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over questions of labor
policy, the multiplicity of tribunals would produce incompatible
rules and frustrate the development of a national labor policy. 8
Furthermore, the Court discerned a congressional intent to entrust
the administration of a national labor policy to a centralized administrative agency equipped with special procedures and expertise concerning labor relations problems. 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to this preemption doctrine. 10 Most notably, the Court has
consistently allowed state courts tq adjudicate tort claims arising
from violence incident to labor disputes.11 Originally, the Court
justified this exception by focusing on the inability of the NLRB to
provide adequate remedies for the victims of labor violence. 12
More recently, the Garmon Court based the exemption of violent
conduct from preemption on the kind of conduct involved, rather
than the kind of relief being sought. 13 The Court stressed the
states' overriding interest in the maintenance of public order 14 and
noted that labor violence touches interests deeply rooted in local
feelings and responsibilities . 15 Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed this justification for exempting labor violence from federal
preemption. 16 Thus, although picket line assaults are "arguably"

359 u .s. 236 (1959).
Id. at 245.
8 Id. at 242-45.
9 Id. at 242.
10
The Court has held that state courts may hear libel suits, Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), claims for alleged breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), and claims for breach of a
bargaining representative's duty of fair representation, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
For a discussion of the preemption doctrine, see generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent
Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 469 (1972).
11
See Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
12
See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). See also note 3 supra.
13
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1958).
1
• Id. at 247.
15 Id. at 244.
16
Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
6

7
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subject to section 8 of the NLRA, 17 states are not preempted from
adjudicating tort claims arising from picket line violence.
The availability of the federal judiciary as an alternative forum
requires satisfaction of certain jurisdictional requirements. Since
unions are considered citizens of the states where their members
reside, 18 federal diversity jurisdiction is unlikely. Yet the federal
courts might be able to exercise pendent jurisdiction 19 over tort
claims resulting from picket line assaults. The federal courts have
exercised pendent jurisdiction over state tort claims resulting from
union violence when these tort claims have arisen from the same
nucleus of operative facts as a suit under section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 20 the provision dealing with secondary
boycotts. In these cases, the individual who had suffered harm
from the economic pressures of the secondary boycott had also
suffered property damage from union violence. 21 Similarly, if an
individual who brought a section 303 suit for damage ·resulting from
a secondary boycott was also assaulted during that boycott, a
federal court is capable of exercising pendent jurisdiction over the
state tort claim for the picket line assault. Since pendent jurisdiction is discretionary, even if this unlikely situation should occur, a
federal court would not necessarily have to assume jurisdiction
over the state tort claim. 22 Thus, tort actions for picket line assaults will usually be adjudicated in state courts. 23
II.

THEORIES FOR IMPOSING TORT LIABILITY ON UNIO.NS

A. Conspiracy

At common law labor unions had no existence as legal entities
independent of their members. 24 Consequently, the courts based
17

See note I supra. See also note 6 and accompanying text supra.
United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
19
In UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), the Court held that the federal courts may
exercise pendent jurisdiction whenever the state and federal claims "derive from a common
nucleus of operative facts," and are such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding." The Court further noted that pendent jurisdiction is
discretionary. Id. ;.t 726-27 (1966).
20
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act allows a person injured by a
secondary boycott to bring suit for damages in a federal district court or any court having
jurisdiction over the parties. 29 U .S.C. § 187 (1970).
21
See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969).
22
See· note 19 supra. The reluctance of federal courts to make needless decisions of state
determinations of law would militate against pendent jurisdiction. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726 (1966). The federal courts would be especially reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over
tort actions for picket line'assaults since the state has a special interest in the adjudication of
these actions. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
23
See Comment, The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 21 U.C.LA. L.
REv. 600, 606-08 (1973).
24
Walker v. Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S.E .. 146 (1938); Karges Furniture
Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local 131. 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905); St. Paul
18
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union liability for picket line assaults on the theory that all members of a union. were engaged in a civil conspiracy. 25 Since unions
can now be sued as unincorporated associations in most jurisidictions,26 courts rarely rely upon this theory today, although it is still
used occasionally in attempts to hold unions liable for picket line
violence. 27
B. Consent

Courts commonly rely upon a theory of consent to hold unions
liable for picket line assaults committed by their members. 28 Under
this theory, unions are responsible for actions they authorize or
ratify. 29 There are two distinct standards for imposing liability on
unions under this theory.
1. The Norris-La Guardia Test-Section 6 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act provides that unions may not be held responsible for
the unlawful acts of their members without clear proof of actual
union participation in, authorization for, or ratification of such
acts. 30 By requiring "clear proof' and "actual" participation,
authorization, or ratification, this section establishes stringent
criteria for imposing liability on unions for the acts of their members. Derived from the Coronado Coal Cases, 31 this test was
incorporated into the Norris-La Guardia Act in order to protect
unions from being weakened by damage judgments resulting from
events beyond their control. 32
Xypothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders Union, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725 (1905). See
generally Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation,
51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941).
25 A civil conspiracy is typically defined as a combination between two or more persons to
accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool
Co., 257 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Ind. 1966). McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455; 181 S.W. 930
(1915). See also Burdick, The Tort Conspiracy as a Crime, And Conspiracy as a Tort, 7
CoLUM. L. REV. 229 (1907); Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36
L.Q. REv. 38 (1920). For a decision applying the conspiracy theory to a picket line asault,
see Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
26 Myers, State Damage Suit by an Employer Against a Labor Union for Injuries lncu"ed
Through Violence During a Strike, 34 TENN. L. REv. 609, 622 (1967).
27 See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
28 Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 KY. L.J. 295, 300-04 (1961).
2
• Id. at 300.
30 29 u.s.c. § 106 (1970).
31 Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1924); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344 (1922). In determining whether the plaintiff corporation could recover treble
damages under section 7 of the Sherman Act for a union conspiracy to restrain interstate
commerce, the Court stated that the international union would be liable for strike violence
only if it "was shown by substantial evidence to have initiated, participated in, or ratified the
interference with plaintiff's business." 259 U.S. at 393'. The Court found no "substantial
evidence" of union involvement despite the fact that the union president and the union
journal reported acts of union violence without criticism.
32 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 737 (1966); S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., !st Sess. 19
(1932).
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In an early decision, the Supreme Court held that the standard
enunciated in section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act applied to
both national and local unions. 33 Subsequently, in UMW v.
Gibbs, 34 the Supreme Court held that this standard should be used
in federal court adjudications of state tort claims arising out of
labor disputes. 35 The Court reasoned that this standard was neces,
sary to keep unions from being destroyed financially by the punitive damage remedies available in many states. 36 Although the
federal courts have never applied the Norris-La Guardia standard
to tort claims for picket line assaults, 37 they have applied this
standard to tort claims for property damage resulting from picket
line violence. 38
Under section 6, unions may be held liable for violent conduct
which they have actually authorized or ratified. To find "actual"
authorization or ratification, however, the courts require proof of
actual participation by the union or its agents in the violent conduct. In Ritchie v. UMW, 39 unidentified saboteurs had dynamited
the entrance to a coal mine during a strike. Although UMW officials had stated that such violence would stop if the employers
signed· a contract, the court held that this was not an actual authorization or ratification under section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia
Act. In Riverside Coal Company v. UMW, 40 however, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals found actual authorization where a UMW
district representative, present during the violence, led the picketing and made repeated threats of violence to police officers and
nonunion workers. Hence, Ritchie and Riverside Coal suggest
that unions will not be held liable under the courts' interpretation
of the Norris-La Guardia standard unless there is actual participation by the union or its agents in the union violence.
To prevail under section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, the
plaintiff must establish by "clear proof' the requisite union par33

United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 407-09 (1947).
'.383 U.S. 715 (1966).
35
The Court rejected the argument that the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (L.M.R.A.) should govern in these situations. The L.M.R.A. provides that
ordinary concepts of agency determine union responsibility for the acts of their members. 29
U .S.C. §§ 152(13), 185(e), 187(b) (1970). Noting that Congress did not repeal section 6 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act when it enacted the L.~.R.A., the Court discerned a congressional
intent to limit the L.M.R.A. standard to the situations covered by the L.M.R.A. 383 U.S. at
736. For a discussion of the L.M.R.A. standard, see notes 62-67 and accompanying text
infra.
36
383 U.S. at 736.
37
The difficulty of obtaining federal jurisdiction over picket line assaults probably accounts for the lack of cases. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
38
UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 ~1966); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969);
Riverside Coal Co. v. UMW, 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1969); Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d
806 (6th Cir. 1968); Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Textile Workers Union, 347 F. Supp. 801 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972).
39
410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969).
0
•
410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1969).
3
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ticipation. 41 In UMW v. Gibbs, 42 the Court interpreted the clear
proof standard to require that the plaintiff present "clear, unequivocal and convincing proof," and to persuade by more than a
bare preponderance of evidence. Thus, this standard requires less
than the criminal burden of proof but more than the "ordinary civil
burden of persuasion. " 43 Although "clear proof' is a demanding
standard, the courts have indicated that this standard may be
satisfied by circumstantial evidence 44 or by an analysis of union
customs and traditions. 45
Some states have "little Norris-La Guardia Acts" which also
require "clear proof' of actual participation, authorization, or
ratification to hold unions liable for picket line violence. 46 Several
state courts have held that their statutes apply only to injunctive
actions, not to damage actions. 47 In Benoit v. Local 299, United
Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, 48 however, the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the state's "little Norris-La Guardia Act"
encompassed tort actions for picket line violence. The court narrowly construed the Norris-La Guardia standard, finding that a
union did not authorize or ratify a picket line assault committed by
two union officials. 49 In a later decision, however, the Connecticut
court held that an international and local union were liable under
this standard where several leading union officials repeatedly participated in strike violence, planned strike activities, and refused to
repudiate violent tactics. 50 Apparently only such overwhelming
evidence of union participation was sufficient to satisfy the Connecticut court's interpretation of the Norris-La Guardia standard.
The purpose of the Norris-La Guardia test was to protect unions,
especially from large punitive damage judgments for acts of violence in which they had not actually participated. 51 It is questionable, however, whether unions need this kind of protection any
longer, for unions have developed to the point where they should

29 u .s.c. § 106 (1970).
383 U.S. 715,737 (1966).
43
Id. The Court defined the "ordinary civil burden of persuasion" as persuasion by a
preponderance of evidence. Id.
44
Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1969).
45
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
46
Many of these acts have tenninology similar to the Norris-La Guardia Act. See, e.g.,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-114 (West 1965).
47
See, e.g., Titus v. Tacoma Smeltennen's Local 25, 62 Wash. 2d 461, 383 P.2d 504
(1963); Nelson v. Haley, 232 Ind. 314, Ill N.E.2d 812 (1953).
48
150 Conn. 266, 188 A.2d 499 (1963).
49
Id. at 275, 188 A.2d at 503.
50
United Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 285 A.2d 330
(1971).
51
See note 32 supra. Congress also enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act with a view to
protecting unions from injunctions. A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 5
(1960).
41

42
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accept "ordinary responsibility" for tort damages. 52 To argue that
the Norris-La Guardia standard is needed to protect unions from
punitive damages reflects a distrust of the courts' ability to limit the
imposition of punitive damages to appropriate situations. Even if
this distrust is warranted, the better solution would be to eliminate
punitive damages, rather than to limit the union's responsibility for
the violent conduct of its members.
· In addition, the Norris-La Guardia test fails to serve other important policies. Specifically, the test places a heavy burden upon
plaintiffs, making it difficult for them to receive compensation.
Furthermore, the test is difficult to define and administer53 and
tr.erefore encourages litigation. Besides burdening judicial resources, this leaves parties uncertain as to their rights and responsibilities.
2. Implied Consent-Most state courts have relied upon a theory
of "implied consent" to hold both local and international unions
liable for picket line assaults. 54 This theory does not demand the
"clear proof" required by the Norris-La Guardia standard.
Moreover, under this doctrine the courts may imply ratification or
a1:1thorization from union silence or omissions regarding acts of
violence. 55
State courts have found that local unions had impliedly consented to picket line assaults in a variety of situations. A South
Carolina court found that a local union ratified an assault when it
arranged bail and paid the fine of a member who committed the
assault and failed to expel the picketers who threatened the victim.56 Similarly, a California court found that a local union ratified
an assault when it failed to expel the member who perpetrated the
assault. 5 7 Furthermore, a Tennessee court held that a local union
authorized an assault because its officers were present during the
assault and apparently encouraged it, even though they did not
participate directly in the violence. 58

52

See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966).
The "clear proof' standard is an unfamiliar concept to most courts, and has only been
vaguely defined by a listing of synonyms. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
54 Coats v. Construction & Gen'l Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1971); McDaniel v. Textile Workers, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d I (1962); Hall v.
Walters. 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
55 Coats v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1971).
56 Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955), cert. denied, 349
953 (1955).
57 Coats v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1971).
58
McDaniel v. Textile Workers. 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S. W.2d 1 (1962). Just before the
assault. the individuals who committed the assaults communicated by telephone with the
business representative of the union. The business representative said, "you know what our
plans are, and you are to carry them out. Keep 'em in until they come out, and when they
come out the gate thin 'em out." Id. at 250, 254 S.W.2d at 7.
53

u:s.
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State- courts have also -held international unions liable under an
implied consent theory. A Tennessee court found ,that an interna.tional union ratified an assault when some of its officials were on
the scene during the assault, and furnished bail money and attorneys to the members charged with the assaults. 59 MoreoveT, several courts have relied upon an implied consent theory to hold
international unions liable for assaults after finding that the local
unions which authorized or ratified the picket line violence were
acting as agents of the intemationals. 60 To determine whether the
local unions were acting as agents for the international, the courts
examined the union constitutions to discover the extent of the
intemational's control over local officers, 61 their ability to suspend
local charters, 62 and their ability to put locals in trusteeship. 63
In determining whether unions have committed unfair labor
practices, the NLRB must often decide whether picket line violence should be imputed to labor unions. Section '2(13) of the
National Labor Relations Act .requires that the ·National Labor
Relations Board apply the ordinary law of agency to this issue. 64
According to the Board's interpretation, union consent can be
inferred from conduct or acquiescence. 65 The Board has frequently
found implied consent where a union failed to indicate disapproval
of coercive acts of which it had knowledge, or where it took no
steps to prevent further acts of violence. 66
In suits to enforce NLRB orders, the federal courts have interpreted section 2(13) to allow imputing the violence of a strike
participant to the union only where there is a showing of agency,
ratification, counseling, incitement, or some other form of union
participation in the violence. 67 This approach appears to place
59 UAW v. American Metal Prods. Co., 56 Tenn. App. 526,408 S.W.2d 682 (1964). Two
federal cases applying Tennessee agem;y law held international unions liable because their
agents directed local violence.'White Oak Coal Co. v. UMW, 381 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 966 (1964); UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F:2d 52 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
60 International Union of Operating Engineers: Local 675 v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634 (Fla.
App. 1975); Overnite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 125
S.E.2d 277 (1962).
61
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 675 v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634, 638
(1975).
62 Id.
63
Overnite Ttansp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 26, 125 S.E.2d
277, 283 (1962).
64 29 u;s.c. § 152(13) (1970).
65 As the National Labor Relations Board found, "Agency is a contractual relationship,
deriving from the mutual consent of principal and agent that the agent shall act for the
principal. But the principal's consent, technically called authorization or ratification, may be
manifested by conduct, sometimes even by passive acquiescence as well as by words."
Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1508 (1948) (italics omitted).
66 See Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Worlcers, 222 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1976); Dairy Employees Local. 695, 221 N:L.R.B. 647 (1975) .
67
.
See, e.g.; N.L.R.B. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 356 F.2d 995, 966 (1st Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966).
.
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greater emphasis on the commission of some positive act, but by
interpreting the ratification concept broadly the federal courts have
applied the section 2(13) test in the same manner as the Board. For
example, in Compton v. Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, Local
225, 68 the court held that a union directing a strike is responsible
for the acts of its pickets if a union agent has established a pattern
of coercive conduct which the strikers are expected to follow, or if
a union agent receives knowledge of coercive acts being committed
by pickets and does nothing to indicate disapproval or prevent the
further commission of such acts. 69 Nevertheless, isolated acts of
violence have not been imputed to a union merely because the
perpetrator of the violence was a union picket. 70
The implied consent test occupies an intermediate position between the Norris-La Guardia standard and that of respondeat
superior. 71 The implied consent standard imposes a lesser burden
on plaintiffs than the Norris-La Guardia standard, for under the
implied consent test plantiffs need not persuade the factfinder by
"clear proof," but can show union consent through union acquiescence or inaction. As a result, this test enables more plaintiffs to
receive compensation. The implied consent test, however, does
not subject unions to unlimited liability, since under the test unions
are not liable for isolated picket line assaults with which they have
no actual connection. 72 Finally, this test is easy to administer
because the NLRB has developed a well-defined body of case law
dealing with union responsibility for picket line violence under the
implied consent test. 73
C. Respondeat Superior

Under the theory of respondeat superior a master is liable for
damages caused by the torts of his servants which are performed in
the scope of their employment, regardless of the master's authorization or ratification of the misconduct. 74 To impose liability on the
basis of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must show both that a
master-servant relationship existed and that the servant was acting
within the scope of his employment when the misconduct occurred. 75 Though the length of the servant's employment, the method
68

343 F. Supp. 884 (D.P.R. 1972).
Id. at 889.
70
See N.L.R.B. v. Service Employees, Local 254, 535 F.2d 1335 (1st Cir. 1976).
11
See notes 72-93 and accompanying text infra.
72
See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
73
See generally Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 KY. L.J. 295, 300
(1961).
74
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1958).
75
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 675 v. Lassiter. 295 So. 2d 634
(1974); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962);
69
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of payment, the nature of the servant's activities, and the master's
power of dismissal are all considered in establishing the masterservant relationship, 76 the master's right to control physical conduct of the servant is the most significant. 77 The scope of employment may be defined in several ways. A servant acting improperly
may be acting within the scope of his employment when his acts
are so closely connected with or incidental to his duties that they
carry out the object of the employment. 78 Under a broader definition, a servant acts within the scope of his employment if his
conduct is not so unforeseeable that it would be unfair to charge
the master with responsibility. 79 Liability under respondeat
superior is usually justified on the ground that it spreads the victim's loss throughout society 80 and that it promotes the efficient
allocation of economic resources. 81
Several state courts have recognized that unions may be liable
for picket line assaults under a theory of respondeat superior. 82
These courts have found that the pickets were servants of their
local83 or their international union. 84 The issue that separates these
courts is whether the assaults were committed within the picket's
scope of employment. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
Humphreys, 85 the court held that two pickets were acting within
the scope of their employment when they left the picket line,
pursued the plaintiff in an automobile and finally assaulted him at a
service station. The court stated that an act is within the scope of a
servant's employment whenever the act is "fairly and naturally"
incident to the master's business and is done with a view to further
the master's interests or from some "emotion which naturally grew

Langness v. Katoner, 42 Wash. 2d 394, 255 P.2d 551 (1953); Hiroshima v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 18 Cal. App 2d 24, 63 P. 2d 340 (1936).
76
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
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out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's
business. " 86 In contrast, the court in Tulsa General Drivers Local
523 v. Conley 81 held that a picket was not acting within the scope of
employment· when he followed the plaintiff several blocks away
from the picket line and assaulted him. The court declared that
only acts similar or incident to the conduct authorized were within
a servant's scope of employment. 88
Since most picket line assaults arise from emotions generated by
the strike, the union will often be subject to liability under the
Humphreys test. Only when an assault arises out of strictly personal malice would a union escape liability under this standard.
Indeed, it has even been proposed that the personal malice exception should be abolished when a plaintiff is seeking recovery from
labor unions for picket line violence. 89 In effect, this would make
unions the insurer of all picket line assaults. The broad construction given by the Humphreys court to "scope of employment" is
inconsistent with the Conley court's construction. The Conley
court limits the "scope of employment" to acts which are similar
or incident to authorized conduct. Accordingly, the union must
authorize some sort of violent activity if it is to be held liable for
picket line assaults. This standard is similar to the implied consent
test which holds unions liable for picket line assaults when the
unions have established a violent course of conduct that pickets are
expected to follow.
Respondeat superior as applied by the Humphreys court is attractive because the victim of almost every picket line assault
could obtain compensation. It has been argued that labor unions
can spread the cost of compensating assault victims "backward"
to their membership by increasing· union dues, and could also
spread this loss "forward" by demanding higher wages, thus increasing the prices of goods to reflect fully the costs of production.90 This in tum would promote a more effjcient allocation of
economic resources. 91
86

The court observed that a servant's act is within the scope of his employment if:
(I) it be something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and if (2) it be done

while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be done, although
mistakenly or ill-advisedly, with a view to further the master's interests, or from
some impulse or emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt
to perform the master's business, and did not arise wholly from some external,
independent, and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his
own account.
Id. at 787, 127 S.E.2d at 103 (italics omitted).
87
288 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1955).
88
Id. at 753.
89
Comment. The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults. 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
600, 622 (1973).
90
Id. at 619-20.
91
For an explanation of the role of respondeat superior in promoting the efficient allocation of economic resources, see generally Calabresi, supra note 81.

528

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:517

It is doubtful, however, whether labor unions are effective lossspreading institutions. Unions cannot spread their loss backward
to the membership to any great degree because the union leadership must look toward reelection, and thus is under pressure not to
increase dues. Moreover, increased dues may jeopardize union
viability by encouraging workers to quit the union and either seek
membership in competing unions or choose against union membership altogether. In addition, unions will not be able to spread the
loss forward to employers by increased wage demands because
employers will be reluctant to increase wages to pay for the costs
of union violence ..
Finally, although respondeat superior compensates victims, the
cost may be too heavy. The role of labor unions in the American
economic system has been recognized by legislatures and courts. 92
Tort actions for picket line assaults subject unions to damage suits
where potentially destructive punitive damage awards can be
made. 93 Holding a union liable where picketers have committed no
acts from which the consent of the union can be implied is too high
a price to pay for victim compensation.

III.

CONCLUSION

The potential for picket line violence is great. When an individual is assaulted by picketers, often his only means of gaining
compensation is to bring a tort action against the union. The courts
and legislatures have developed three standards for imputing the
violence of pickets to unions: the Norris-La Guardia standard, the
implied consent test, and respondeat superior.
The Norris-La Guardia test may protect unions to a degree
unwarranted by modem economic conditions. Furthermore, this
protection is imposed by placing a greater burden of proof upon the
victim who is in need of compensation. In contrast, respondeat
superior makes the union a bearer of all loss, even though the union
cannot effectively spread this cost to its members or to consumers.
The implied consent theory is the most appropriate for imposing
liability on unions for picket line assaults. Under this test many
victims obtain compensation, yet unions are still protected from
responsibility for isolated acts of violence. Moreover, this test is
easy to administer because of the large body of case law which the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board have developed in
applying it.
-David R. Case
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